Mao Zedong was a Chinese political revolutionary who joined the CCP in 1921, and quickly dominated the party due to his strategic manoeuvring and astute thinking. His political beliefs were rigid and unwavering as his experiences as a young revolutionary during the political vacuum in the era of warlordism and the failed 1911 revolution showed him that in order to sustain power, a leader must be willing to use any means necessary to do so, regardless of how brutal or violent. This belief was evident in his capture and consolidation of power, within the CCP as well as in China overall. The extent to which force aided Mao in his gaining of power is debated due to a myriad of factors such as the following.
One can argue that Mao Zedong heavily relied on the usage of force and terror in order to establish his dominance within the CCP. He frequently orchestrated purges within the party as he believed it was essential in order to completely eradicate reformist thoughts. For instance, in 1942 Mao undertook the Rectification of Conduct Campaign, under which party members were coerced to read texts prescribed by Mao, many of which were written by Mao himself. The motive was to trigger self reflection and make the party members realise their errors in belief, which they would then publicly apologise for and engage in self criticism in front of other CCP members. Under the pretext of Mao’s orders, the head of security, Kang Sheng, arrested 1000 CCP members, many of whom were imprisoned and tortured subsequently. 60 CCP officials committed suicide in order to avoid public humiliation at any cost, highlighting the terror which the purge instilled in each member, greatly increasing Mao’s power as obedience and conformist beliefs surged within the party. Thus, Mao used force and terror in order to strengthen his position within the CCP and move towards cult status.
Additionally, Mao used force not only as a means for acquiring internal power, but also as a tool to increase the CCP’s popularity, and thus the power CCP held in china. For instance, Mao implemented land reform policies in Yunan and neighbouring provinces. He instructed the Red Army to occupy neighbours areas and drive the warlords who governed the areas away, by shooting the and using violent means if necessary.This was often a brutal process as taking the land from the landlords away and reallocating it to the peasants went against the interests of warlords, thus it mostly resulted in violent conflict. By re-allocating the land to the peasants the CCP became increasingly popular amongst the peasantry as they were seen as saviours of the masses, protecting the interests of the exploited. Thus, the CCP used force and violent means to acquire the support of the peasants, and as peasants accounted for 88% of China’s population, it led to the CCP becoming a stronger political party, with steadily increasing power.
However, on the other hand, one can argue that Mao Zedong relied on propaganda as well to gain power through popularity. Taking the previous example of land reform policies, apart from the usage of brutal means to obtain land, Mao also ordered the red army to use propaganda to win over the peasants. For example, Mao instructed the red army to treat the peasants well and take care of them by providing aid and speaking in a respectful manner, rather than oppressing them and neglecting their needs, as all previous Chinese armies had done. The red army soldiers had to be courteous and honest. Additionally, basic medical services and education and literacy programmes were also implemented in the villages of the peasants. These factors combined made the peasants feel that the communists under Mao were truly leaders of the masses, and cared about the lives of the oppressed. Thus, due to effective CCP propaganda which created the party’s image as courteous, humble and helpful made the peasants support Mao, and thus increased the party’s support greatly as peasants massively dominated the Chinese demographic.
Similarly, like the communist policies and behaviour towards the population, various significant events in China, and Mao’s strategic reactions to them, also led to a surge in the popularity of the communists. For example, in 1934, the communists in Jiangxi were on the brink of extinction due to continuous harassment by GMD forces, which culminated in 1934, in them being completely surrounded by GMD forces. Mao’s reaction to this was brilliant and effective due to his invaluable role as an effective strategist. He led the communists to Yanan, by travelling for a year, finally reaching a safe haven in 1935. This was known as the Long March and was viewed as a heroic act by Mao as it showed the unwavering dedication of the communists to accomplish their goals. The Long March consolidated Mao’s position within the CCP as he prevented the party’s termination, and it also led to the CCP becoming more powerful as it showed the party bouncing back even from its lowest point. CCP rebuilt, portraying itself as a force to be reckoned with, and making GMD appear weak as it failed to succeed in crushing the communists. Thus, through Mao’s strategic decisions which showed the resilient nature of the CCP, Mao gained more power within the party and also expanded CCP’s power and influence.
But despite the advancement of CCP due to its effective propaganda and defence strategies from opposing forces, the CCP would not have been able to capture power without the use of force. This is because the CCP initially had a weak and ineffective military, as seen in the Shanghai Massacre of 1927 as the communists were unable to resist the mass execution, resulting in countless deaths. Moreover, the reactionary measure known as the Autumn Harvest Rising, was unsuccessful due to GMD’s forces being much stronger and larger. However, through the CCP’s use of force in the following years, the Red Army became a modern and advanced army. Despite being outnumbered by the GMD in 1949 and the GMD receiving American aid, CCP won the civil war due to the discipline, structures and high morale of the army, outlining the party’s military progress. If the CCP continued to have a weak and unmodernised army in 1949, it would not have so the civil war due to GMD’s considerable military advantage. Additionally, without winning the civil war it is highly unlikely that the CCP would have gained power in China, at least in the foreseeable future. This is supported by the fact that after losing the civil war, Jiang Jeishi had to flee to Taiwan because of the heavy animosity and hatred between the parties, created due to a bitter history of false alliances and betrayals. Thus due to the momentous impact of winning the civil war half, the use of force by the CCP during the civil war outlines that using force aided the party to not only explicitly become more powerful, but it also led to the party’s ultimate victory over the GMD, which set the base for the formation of an authoritarian state under Mao Zedong.
In conclusion, the claim that the use of force by Mao Zedong and the CCP was the primary method used to obtain power, is true to a large extent as Mao’s political beliefs of using violent means and brutal methods, if necessary, in order to do whatever it took, as well the military capabilities of the Red Army, played an invaluable role in leading to Mao consolidating power within the CCP and thus, establishing control over China and forming an authoritarian state governed by him. However, this statement is not completely true as there were other significant methods used for the capture of power, most notably effective propaganda and strategic planning.