Ashoka, the third emperor of the Mauryan Empire, and Akbar, also the third emperor of the Mughal Empire ruled over an area that spanned nearly the entire Indian subcontinent. Empires governing an area so large bring their own set of challenges that concern the stability of the Emperor’s sovereignty. Challenges like coups and rebellions in Akbar’s reign and the rebellion at Taxila just before Ashoka’s reign pose a threat to the precious reign of the Emperor. Therefore, the creation of a favourable self-image becomes paramount for an emperor to maintain stability and exercise greater control over their territory.
The self-image of an emperor continues to pass down from generation to generation even though their reign has long passed, some emperors have their once beloved self-image replaced by a wholly new character that is seen as a thorough despot by certain political circles, who then project their bigotry on a minority of the country. While others “walk away” almost scot-free withstanding any change to their contemporary perception. What makes the self-image of certain rulers so malleable that it can be used to further strain communal tensions, while others are unchanged? Is it because some did not “do a good enough job” to maintain a favourable self-image or that people wilfully ignore evidence that would otherwise contradict their idea of what the ruler was truly like?
I emphasize all these questions to highlight what questions I seek to address. I will create a chronology of sorts, starting from the circumstances that lead to the need to create a friendly self-image, the measures taken to do so and ending with lightly touching on its impact on the contemporary world. This chronology would be created within the framework of Ashoka and Akbar’s reign. Consequently, I would primarily be referring to Nayanjot Lahiri’s “Ashoka in Ancient India” along with Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmaniyam’s “The Mughal State 1526-1750”.
Ashoka’s rise to power was anything but stable; he had inherited a throne that he was not meant to occupy and only did so after a long struggle. However, not much is known about Ashoka’s rise to power except the information provided by two anthologies- the Northern Buddhist narrative (which includes the Ashokavadana) and the Sri Lankan narrative/texts (like the Dipavamsa). The difference between these two narratives lies in their portrayal of Ashoka’s pre-Kalinga reign; the Northern Buddhist narrative tells us a tale of a sadistically cruel ruler that adhered to Chanakya’s realpolitik, while the Sri Lankan texts tell us about an inquisitive and restlessly curious emperor. Due to the inherent nature of hagiographical texts and the historical context, biases certainly exist. But we cannot blatantly ignore these texts/narratives and dismiss them as mere fictitious accounts since according to Nayanjot Lahiri, “plausible speculation must serve instead of an empirically strong and convincing narrative because there are neither eyewitness accounts nor any that survive from the years proximate with his lifetime”.
Most importantly, these texts create differing public images of Ashoka even though they were written down after his reign had passed. Different groups of people created different personas of Ashoka based on how he interacted with their group. This shows that certain groups of people can fashion different identities of a person as powerful and influential as the Emperor without being directed to do so. I claim that these narratives were written down due to the advantages that association with a figure like the emperor brings. The Northern Buddhist narrative created the public image that depicted him as a tyrant until he adopted Buddhism, this common trope in hagiographical texts since they would want their religion to be viewed as transformative and capable of “taming” a cruel a despot as Ashoka. While the Sri Lankan texts created a more favourable image since the Anuradhapura Kingdom would have wanted to not strain their relationship with the mighty Mauryan empire (the existence of a strong alliance between both is well documented).
The two anthologies only came into being on account of Ashoka’s interaction with the groups of people that were responsible for creating said anthologies. This leaves the question as to what the idea of Ashoka as an Emperor was for the ordinary person residing in the countryside, or to put it more cynically, how could the Emperor skew the public opinion of the people in the vast countryside in order to exercise greater control?
After the Kalinga war of 261 BCE, Ashoka was disgusted and deeply saddened by the destruction he had caused simply because realpolitk dictated him to do so. A sudden transformation via the proselytization of a wholly different religion (i.e. Buddhism) took place. To this end, he ordered the inscription of epigraphs on various stone pillars, rocks, cave walls and boulders. These are famously known as the Edicts of Ashoka. These edicts do not boast of the spoils and riches Ashoka had obtained through his conquests, but rather spread the message of Buddhism and established new moral rules around its key tenets.
Examining the first rock edict of Rupnath (a minor rock edict) might help us understand what Ashoka wanted out of his edicts. Through this edict, Ashoka has introduced a whole new representation of his realm, which he calls Jambudvipa. According to Ashoka, it is only in Jambudvipa that he established contact between humans and God which had previously not existed. Thus, according to Nayanjot Lahri, it was “a way of saying that by creating a shared moral universe for his people with their gods, their emperor had made Jambudvipa a land of greater morality”. He goes on to emphasize the role that his zeal (which became stronger when associated himself with the Sangha) and piety played in the establishment of this contact. Thus, placing himself at the centre of this seemingly important event, Ashoka has been granted a place of immense glory in the land of Jambudvipa. However, this glory is made accessible even to the common person when it is highlighted that anyone regardless of status and can become similarly zealous.
Ashoka had made himself the face of Buddhism, consequently, he shared his struggles to adhere to the tenets of this religion (like emphasizing his lack of zealous in the first verse) because of this I believe that the common folk were able to relate to Ashoka’s struggle and hardship when they were undergoing their own transformational journey. Thus, Ashoka created a grassroots movement. This leads me to the point of contention I have with Nayanjot Lahri’s take on the political motives for this grassroots movement which is that “it[the movement in question] made it simpler to expect his subjects to try and emulate him..”, I disagree with this and believe that the political motive for the emperor was rather to show himself as more humble and almost relatable since the bloodbath of the Kalinga war made him anything but those two things. Consequently, he would gain the ability to exercise greater control over the public.
Ashoka had therefore established a new public image for himself just two and half years after the brutal war of Kalinga by portraying himself as a zealous follower of Buddhism who was responsible for the mingling of God and man while wanting his followers to be as equally zealous as him. The inscription of his voice in stone also ensured that this part of his transformation was special and served as an example for people to follow. His need to create a favourable self-image was not explicit but was deeply rooted in his religious transformation. An interesting observation regarding this is given by Nayanojot Lahri, “His [Ashoka’s] inclusive moral path is patently the Buddha’s”.
Akbar, the third emperor of the mighty Mughal empire, was chiefly responsible for centralising the political order by establishing an imperial authority. The establishment of a strong imperial authority (and subsequent political centralisation) played a strong role in the formation of a favourable public image of the emperor since it made Akbar increasingly inseparable from the state itself and to that end J.F. Richards points out that, “To challenge or destroy the Emperor’s person was to challenge or destroy the imperial system”. This inseparability only benefits an emperor in times of glorious victories because the successes of the state are credited to the ruler and not the state while the opposite would occur in times of grave losses. However, the latter was not true during Akbar’s reign since victories were all too common an occurrence. According to J.F. Richards, the groundwork for political centralisation was laid when Akbar succeeded in forging new and stronger relationships with the administrative and military elite of recently conquered territories. The facilitation of such relationships took through the induction of the elites from conquered territories into military and administrative ranks. This was done all the while maintaining a delicate balance between new and old ethnic groups.
The establishment of entirely new imperial identities like mansabdar and amir also played a major role in Akbar’s endeavours. From this, I infer that the motive for political centralisation was to prevent the fostering of any secessionist tendencies and exercise greater control over newly conquered territories all the while keeping his already conquered domain in check; this also had the consequence of bolstering his public image.
Political consolidation was not only confined to the elites, the common man was affected as well through the public expressions made by Akbar, with the most important being the establishment of a new imperial capital – Fatehpur Sikri. The new capital would facilitate Akbar’s association with spiritual authorities (i.e. the Sufi saints) through the construction of the tomb of Shaikh Salim Chishti. This religious association was of great importance as a favourable association with said religious authorities would have been immensely beneficial for Akbar’s public image, especially in the public realm.
Shaikh Salim was described by the translator Abd al-Qadir Badayuni as, “one of the greatest Shaikhs of Hind, and a high master of the different stages of the advancement in the knowledge of God”. Given Shaikh Salim’s reputation, it was not surprising that Akbar consulted him frequently about the problems that vexed him deeply, with the most prominent being the absence of a male heir (seemingly because of his inability to do so). Shaikh Salim envisaged the birth of a male heir, subsequently, when a male was born he was conferred the Shaikh’s name. The bond between the two authorities of almost opposite realms (the temporal and the spiritual realm) was important for Akbar since he could now attach some form of religious sanctity to his new capital, especially through the construction of Shaik Salim’s tomb (which later became a Durgah) and as I had already mentioned, the new capital would be deeply entrenched in Akbar’s identity. This would have helped Akbar to use the religious sensibilities of people to strengthen his power while creating a public image of a mystic. However, religious authority was still partly detached from the imperial authority that Akbar was trying to establish. Therefore, Akbar enlisted the sons and grandsons of Shaikh Salim to the office of mansabdar rather than giving them control of the Durgah.
However, Fatehpur-Sikri would not be the centre of court and administration for long as rebellious forces(the Yusufaiz tribes) were brewing in the Hindu Kush forcing Akbar to move his entire court and administration away from the capital. Although it would seem that all the structures and alliances that were made to quell the same from happening were now failing. However, the inherent nature of the aforementioned structures and alliances never extended its scope to such events. The Yusufaiz tribe was diplomatically annexed by Akbar in 1585, shorty after this, Akbar received several complaints about the harassment of merchants and travellers by the Yusufaiz tribe, therefore he dispatched an army under the command of Zain Khan and Abdul Fath. The subsequent defeat forced Akbar to leave his capital to combat the threat. This almost instantaneous retaliation by the tribe after annexation did not allow the well-established structures to come into effect. Hence it would not indicate the failure of the imperial authority and Akbar’s public image.
The desertion of Fatehpur Sikri would show the Timurid roots of the Mughal empire through the establishment of a mobile capital (Akbar’s camp). This would inevitably leave the previous capital deserted and the whole empire vulnerable, therefore all the courts and administrative staff were moved out of the capital. Efforts were also taken to make it functionally similar to Fatehpur Sikri. For example, a covered audience tent was made to be the Diwan-i-Khas(hall of private audience) which lead to an uncovered rope area which was the Diwan-i-Amm (hall of public audience). This move would make Akbar even more inseparable from the empire since the capital and the whole administration would move wherever he went. Thus indirectly communicating to his immediate subordinates and the nobles about how much power he possessed. Even the common person would feel the impact of this change; according to P.L. Gupta, the camp became the leading centre for the minting of silver and gold coins. These coins were not struck with the name of the place where they were minted but were struck with legends like ‘struck at the camp of good fortune’ or ‘seat of the caliphate’. This would show the common person that the emperor was not detached from the state and still possessed enormous power even though he had abandoned his previous capital. J.F. Richards regarding the generational concern for a fixed capital city remarks that “Akbar reversed this fixed concern, fusing, instead, all authority within himself and ultimately within the dynasty which succeeded him”.
Hence, Akbar through three important schemes – the shifting of capitals, religious associations and accommodation of new ethnicities (through the formulation of imperial authorities) created a public image of an emperor that was the embodiment of the empire and its values (conferred to it by Islam). This would prevent anyone from challenging his authority since it would mean going against the entire Mughal empire and its religious values.
In the 21st Century, 1200 years after Ashoka’s reign and 417 years after Akbar’s reign, both have wholly different and almost contradictory images in the public realm. As I had mentioned before, Akbar has now occupied the same position as Adolf Hitler in certain political circles while Ashoka is revered in our nation; this reverence clearly seen since the state emblem of India is the lion capital of Ashoka itself. Now to answer the question of why this is so. After listing down all the exhaustive measures taken by both the emperors I do not believe it is because they did not ‘do a good enough job’. Rather, I believe that Akbar had made himself an integral part of the empire because of which he would inevitably have to bare the brunt of the cruel acts his successors would on to commit. On the other hand, Ashoka distanced himself from his empire and tried to proselytize a relatively new religion. The recent baseless scrutiny that Mughal history is facing plays a part in this problem too. This illustrates that no matter how much an emperor succeeds in creating a favourable public image, it does not guarantee that it will last forever.