Introduction
The Agriculture Agreement (the “Agreement”) entered into force on January 1, 1995. The Agreement’s preamble notes that the Uruguay Round reform program’s long-term goal is to develop a fair and market-oriented agriculture trade system. Specific commitments to reduce support and protection in the areas of domestic support, export subsidies, and market access, as well as the construction of stronger and more operationally effective GATT rules and regulations, are part of the reform agenda. Non-trade problems, including as food security and the need to safeguard the environment, are also addressed in the agreement. Non-trade concerns, including as food security and the need to safeguard the environment, are addressed in the agreement, and developing nations are given preferential and differential treatment, including increased access to agricultural products of particular export interest to these Members.
WTO agreements and understandings on goods trade, including the GATT 1994 and WTO agreements on customs value, import licencing procedures, pre-shipment inspection, emergency safeguard measures, subsidies, and technical obstacles to trade, apply to agriculture in principle. Where these accords and the Agreement on Agriculture conflict, the terms of the Agreement on Agriculture take precedence. Agriculture is covered by the WTO Agreements on Trade in Services and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
Trade Policies Prior To The WTO
Although agriculture has always been included by the GATT, there were numerous significant distinctions in the regulations that applied to agricultural primary products versus industrial products prior to the WTO. Export subsidies on agricultural primary items were permitted under the GATT of 1947, while export subsidies on industrial products were prohibited. The only requirement was that agricultural export subsidies not be used to capture more than a “equitable share” of the product’s global exports (Article XVI:3 of GATT). The GATT rules also authorised countries to use import limitations (such as import quotas) in some circumstances, such as when these limits were required to enforce measures to effectively limit domestic output (see GATT Article XI:2(c)). This exemption was also contingent on maintaining a certain percentage of imports in relation to domestic production.
In practice, however, various non-tariff border restrictions were imposed on imports without any effective counterpart restrictions on domestic output or minimum import access. In other circumstances, this was accomplished by employing procedures not specifically mentioned in Article XI. Other exceptions and country-specific derogations, such as grandfather clauses, waivers, and accession protocols, were reflected. In other circumstances, non-tariff import restrictions were kept in place for no obvious reason. All of this resulted in a proliferation of agricultural trade barriers, including import bans, quotas setting maximum import levels, variable import taxes, minimum import prices, and non-tariff restrictions maintained by state trading businesses. Cereals, meat, dairy goods, sugar, and a variety of fruits and vegetables have all experienced trade obstacles on a scale that is unheard of in other commercial sectors.
Domestic markets were partly insulated as a result of measures put in place following the fall of commodity prices during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Furthermore, many governments in the aftermath of the second world war were preoccupied with raising domestic agricultural production in order to feed their expanding populations. Many governments, notably in the developed world, have used market price support to achieve this goal and to preserve a certain balance between the development of rural and urban incomes, reduced in a number of developing countries the incentive for farmers to increase or even maintain their agricultural production levels.
Market Access
Members have changed their non-tariff measures to equivalent binding tariffs as part of the reform programme. Tariff rate quotas are used to provide some more market access, and tariffs are being reduced. Special measures are used to give contingency protection, and alerts are used to provide transparency. On the issue of market access, the Uruguay Round resulted in a significant systemic shift: from a situation in which a slew of non-tariff restrictions hampered agricultural trade flows to a regime of tariff-only protection with reduction promises. The main goals of this fundamental shift have been to boost agricultural investment, production, and trade by
(I)improving agricultural market access conditions to make them more transparent, predictable, and competitive, and
(ii) establishing or strengthening the link between national and international agricultural markets and
(iii) relying more prominently on the market for guiding scarce resources into their most productive uses both within the agricultural sector and economy-wide.
Prior to the Uruguay Round, tariffs were often the only form of protection for agricultural products; the Round resulted in the WTO “binding” a maximum amount for these duties. Non-tariff barriers, on the other hand, were used to restrict market access for numerous other products. This was especially true for important temperate zone agricultural crops, although not always. The Uruguay Round of talks intended to break through these hurdles. A “tariffication” package was approved for this aim, which included, among other things, the replacement of agriculture-specific non-tariff measures with a tariff that provided an equivalent degree of protection. The tariffs generated from the tariffication process account for around a fifth of the total number of agricultural tariff lines, on average, among the developed country members. This percentage is much lower for developing country members. Following the coming into force of the Agriculture Agreement, non-tariff measures targeting agriculture are now prohibited, and tariffs on nearly all agricultural products traded internationally are now bound by the WTO.
Schedule Of Tariff Concessions
Each WTO member has a tariff concessions “schedule” that covers all agricultural products. These concessions are a part of the Uruguay Round’s outcomes, have been formally annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol [cross-reference], and are now a part of the GATT 1994 [cross-reference]. The schedule specifies the maximum tariff that can be levied on imports into the territory of the Member concerned for each individual agricultural commodity, or, in some situations, agricultural items defined more broadly. The tariffs in the schedules include those that emerged through the tariffication process, which are frequently significantly higher, considerably are far higher than industrial tariffs, indicating the prevalence of non-tariff agricultural interventions prior to the WTO. Many developing countries have set “ceiling” tariffs, which are higher than the rates in place prior to the WTO, on previously unbound tariffs.
Members from developed countries have pledged to drop their tariffs by 36% on average for all agricultural products over a six-year period beginning in 1995, with a minimum cut of 15% for any product. The reduction for poor countries are 24 and 10%, respectively, and will be phased in over ten years. In many situations, developing nation members who bound tariffs at ceiling levels did not commit to tariff reductions. Members from the least-developed countries were obligated to bind all agricultural tariffs but not to reduce them.
WTO Members were expected to maintain current import access opportunities for tariffed products at levels corresponding to those in place during the 1986-88 base period as part of the tariffication package. If such “current” access accounted for less than 5% of domestic consumption of the product in issue during the base period, a (extra) minimum access opportunity required to be provided on a most-favorable-nation basis. This was done to ensure that current and minimal access opportunities together represented at least 3% of base-period consumption in 1995, and that they were gradually expanded to reach 5% of base-period consumption in 2000 (developed nation Members) or 2004(developing country Members), respectively.
Tariff quotas are commonly used to implement current and minimum access opportunities. In the event of minimum access, the applicable duty had to be low or minimal, either in absolute terms or in comparison to the “regular” ordinary customs tax that applies to all imports outside of the tariff quota. These tariff quotas, as well as the applicable tariff rates and any other tariff quota-related criteria, are detailed in the schedules of the WTO Members involved.
While the great majority of agricultural tariff quotas stem from the Uruguay Round discussions, a few of such commitments were made as a result of WTO membership. Tariff quotas are currently stipulated in the schedules of 37 Members (as of July 1999). There are 1374 unique tariff quotas in all. These tariff quotas are legally binding, as contrast to autonomous tariff quotas that Members can create at any time, for example, to stabilise domestic prices after a bad harvest.
The Prohibition Of Non-Tariff Border Measures
Agriculture-specific non-tariff measures are prohibited under Article 4.2 of the Agricultural Agreement. Quantitative import limitations, variable import taxes, minimum import prices, discretionary import licencing procedures, voluntary export restraint agreements, and non-tariff measures implemented by state-owned companies are examples of such measures. Other than “regular customs taxes,” all other border measures are now prohibited. Although Article XI:2(c) of the GATT [cross-reference] continues to allow non-tariff import restrictions on fisheries products, it is no longer in effect for agricultural products because the Agreement on Agriculture has supplanted it. Article 4.2 of the Agricultural Agreement, on the other hand, does not preclude the adoption of non-tariff import limitations in accordance with the norms of the GATT or other WTO agreements that apply to traded goods in general (industrial or agricultural). Balance-of-payments provisions (Articles XII and XVIII of the GATT), general safeguard provisions (Articles XIX of the GATT and the related WTO agreement), general exceptions (Articles XX of the GATT), the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, or other general, non-agriculture-specific WTO provisions are all examples of such measures.
Special Treatment
The Agricultural Agreement included a “special treatment” clause (Annex 5) under which four countries were allowed to maintain non-tariff border measures on particular products during the time of tariff reductions, subject to tight criteria (with the possibility of extending the special treatment, subject to further negotiations). One of the requirements is that market access in the form of gradually rising import quotas be provided for the products in question. Rice is involved in the cases of Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, and cheese and sheepmeat are involved in the case of Israel. The products and countries concerned are: rice in the case of Japan, Korea and the Philippines; and cheese and sheepmeat in the case of Israel. As of 1 April 1999, Japan has ceased to apply special treatment.
The Special Safeguard Provisions
Members have the right to invoke the special safeguard provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture (Article 5) for tariffied products as a third element of the tariffication package, provided that a reservation to this effect (“SSG”) appears beside the products concerned in the relevant Member’s schedule. 38 Members have retained the right to utilise the special safeguard provisions, but only for a restricted number of products in each circumstance.
When certain circumstances are met, the special safeguard rules allow for the implementation of an additional tariff. The conditions include either a predetermined increase in imports (volume trigger) or a drop in import price below a specified reference price on a shipment-by-shipment basis (price trigger). The higher duties only apply until the end of the year in question if the volume trigger is used. Any additional duty can only be assessed on the shipment in question if the price trigger occurs. Imports that are subject to tariff quotas are exempt from the additional taxes.
Notification Obligation
Members’ schedules contain the bound agriculture tariffs and tariff quota commitments. Members are not required to notify the Committee on Agriculture of their tariffs. Applied tariffs, on the other hand, must be presented to other WTO bodies, such as the Committee on Market Access and the Trade Policy Review process.
Members with tariff quotas and the right to use special safeguard provisions must notify the Committee on Agriculture on an ad hoc and annual basis. An “up-front” notification was required at the start of the implementation period, outlining how each tariff quota would be administered. Such notices reveal, for example, whether imports are permitted on a “first-come, first-served” basis or if import licences are required — and, in the latter case, who is eligible to apply for a licence and how they are distributed. If the mechanism of allocation under any tariff quota changes, an ad hoc notification is necessary.
Members who have the authority to employ the special safeguard provisions must notify their trading partners before using them for the first time so that the parameters of the special safeguard action, such as the volume or price used to trigger it, can be established. Ahead of time notification of the required reference prices was also available in the case of the price trigger. A summary notification of the usage of the special safeguard is also required every year.
Domestic Support
The Uruguay Round’s agricultural package dramatically altered how local support for agricultural farmers was treated under the GATT 1947. One of the main goals has been to discipline and reduce domestic support while also allowing governments to establish domestic agriculture policy in response to the large diversity of special circumstances that exist in individual countries and agricultural sectors. The agreed-upon strategy also aims to guarantee that domestic support measures do not undermine specific binding commitments in the areas of market access and export competition.
The primary conceptual concern is that domestic support can be divided into two categories: support that has no or limited trade distortions (commonly referred to as “Green Box” measures) and trade-distorting support (often referred to as “Amber Box” measures). Government-provided agricultural research or training, for example, is classified as the former, whereas government buying-in at a guaranteed price (known as “market price support”) is classified as the latter. All domestic support for agricultural producers is subject to guidelines under the Agriculture Agreement. Furthermore, with some exceptions, the total monetary value of Amber Box initiatives is subject to reduction obligations as outlined in the schedule of each WTO Member providing such support.
The Agriculture Agreement establishes a set of general and measure-specific requirements that must be completed in order for measures to be included in the Green Box (Annex 2). Under the WTO, these measures are exempt from reduction requirements and can even be increased without budgetary constraints. The Green Box applies to both developed and developing nation members, with developing country members receiving preferential treatment in terms of government stockholding programmes for food security and discounted food prices for the urban and rural poor. The general criteria are that the measures must have no or little trade-distorting or production-distorting consequences.The general criterion is that the measures must have no or minimal trade-distorting or production-distorting consequences. They must be provided through a publicly funded government programme (including money foregone by the government) that does not involve consumer transfers and must not have the impact of giving price support to producers.
Government Service Programmes
Many government service programmes are covered under the Green Box, including general government services, public stockholding programmes for food security, and domestic food aid, as long as the basic criteria and some measure-specific criteria are met by each measure. The Green Box thus allows for the continuation (and enhancement) of programmes such as research, which includes general research, research related to environmental programmes, and research on specific products; pest and disease control programmes, which include both general and product-specific pest and disease control measures and education ; Inspection services, such as general inspection services and inspection of specific products for health, safety, grading, or standardisation purposes; marketing and promotion services; infrastructural services, such as electricity reticulation, roads and other modes of transportation, market and port facilities, water supply facilities, and so on; expenditures related to the accumulation and holding of agricultural commodities. Many of the regular programmes of governments are thus given the “green light” to continue.
Direct Payments To Producers
The Green Box also allows for the use of direct payments to farmers that are unrelated to production decisions, i.e., the farmer receives a payment from the government, but the payment has no bearing on the type or volume of agricultural production (“decoupling”). The criteria forbid any correlation between the amount of such payments, on the one hand, and production, prices, or factors of production in any year following a defined base period. Furthermore, there will be no requirement for production in order to earn such payouts. Additional conditions that must be met vary depending on the sort of measure in question, however they may include: income assistance measures that are not linked to employment; income insurance and safety-net programmes ; natural disaster relief; a range of structural adjustment assistance programmes; and certain payments under environmental programmes and under regional assistance programmes.
Other Exempt Measure
Two more categories of domestic assistance measures are free from reduction requirements under the Agreement on Agriculture, in addition to those covered by the Green Box (Article 6). Certain developmental measures in underdeveloped nations, as well as certain direct payments under production-limitation programmes, fall under this category. In addition, so-called de minimis levels of support are not subject to diminution.
Developmental Measures
Aside from the Green Box’s particular and differential treatment, measures of aid, whether direct or indirect, that are aimed to boost agricultural and rural development and are an intrinsic aspect of developing countries’ development programmes fall into the developmental category. They include investment subsidies for agriculture in developing country Members, agricultural input subsidies for low-income or resource-poor producers in developing country Members, and domestic support for producers in developing country Members to encourage diversification away from illegal narcotic crops.
Blue Box
Direct payments provided under production restriction programmes (also known as “Blue Box” measures) are exempt from obligations if they are made on set areas, yields, or animal numbers. Payments that are made on less than 85% of production in a specific base period also fall into this category. While the Green Box measures cover decoupled payments, the Blue Box measures demand production in order to get payments, but the actual payments do not correspond to the current quantity of that production.
De minimis
All domestic agricultural producer support measures that do not fall into one of the exempt categories are subject to reduction commitments. Domestic support policies include things like market price support, direct production subsidies, and input subsidies. However, under the Agreement’s de minimis rules, there is no obligation to cut such trade-distorting domestic support in any year in which the total value of product-specific support does not exceed 5% of the total value of production of the agricultural product in question. Non-product specific support that amounts to less than 5% of the overall value of agricultural produce is likewise protected from decrease. Developed countries are subject to a 5% de minimis barrier, whereas underdeveloped countries are subject to a 10% de minimis ceiling.
Reduction Commitments
During the base period, twenty-eight Members (including the European Commission) had non-exempt domestic support, resulting in reduction commitments in their schedules. The reduction obligations are expressed as a “Total Aggregate Measurement of Assistance” (Total AMS), which is a single figure that incorporates both product-specific and non-product-specific support. Members having a Total AMS must cut base period assistance by 20% over 6 years (developed country members) or 13% over 10 years (non-developed country members) (developing country Members). The Current Total AMS value of non-exempt measures in any year of the implementation period must not exceed the planned Total AMS limit as provided in the schedule for that year. In other words, the WTO limits the maximum levels of such support.
Any domestic support not covered by one or more of the exemption categories listed above, in the event of Members with no scheduled reduction commitments, must be kept within the applicable “product-specific” and “non-product-specific” de minimis levels.
Aggregate Measurement Of Support
Within the non-exempt category, price assistance has been the most important sort of policy measure. Price support can come in the form of managed pricing (which involve consumer transfers) or specific sorts of government direct payments. Price support is generally calculated by multiplying the difference between the applied administered price and a specified fixed external reference price (“world market price”) by the quantity of production eligible to receive the administered price for the purposes of Current Total AMS calculations. The details of the calculations are provided in Annexes 3 and 4 of the Agriculture Agreement, and they are also integrated into Members’ schedules by waiving a fee for example, to arrive at a product-specific AMS, which is then compared to the de minimis standard that applies Non-product-specific subsidies are calculated separately and only included in the Current Total AMS if they exceed the applicable de minimis level, as in the previous situation.
Equivalent Measurement Of Support
When it is not possible to calculate a product-specific AMS as specified in the Agreement, a “Equivalent Measurement of Support” is used (EMS). The EMS is typically determined using budgetary outlays, such as money paid by governments to support a product, rather than market price support computed using a fixed external reference price.
Notification Obligation
The extent of each Member’s domestic support measures must be reported to the Committee on Agriculture. This necessitates a list of all exempt measures, which include the Green Box, developmental measures, direct payments under production-limiting programmes (Blue Box), and de minimis levels of support. In addition, when the existence of measures necessitates it, Members with planned domestic support reduction commitments must calculate AMS and notify the Current Total AMS.
If a Member does not have such scheduled obligations but has support measures that are not covered by one of the exempt categories, a notification must be sent demonstrating that the non-exempt support is within the appropriate de minimis levels. The Committee on Agriculture has created special formats to make it easier to comply with the notification requirements.
Except for least-developed country members, who are only required to notify every other year, the notification requirement is annual. Members from developing countries can also ask the Committee to exempt measures that do not fit under the Green Box, developmental, or Blue Box categories from the yearly notification requirement.
All Members must inform any changes to existing or new measures in the exempt categories, in addition to their yearly notification requirements. The Committee on Agriculture examines these notifications on a regular basis as well.
The annual notification obligations are not very demanding in many circumstances because most Members do not have domestic assistance measures other than those that fall into the exempt categories. They are, nevertheless, helpful in providing a framework for policy deliberations within the Committee on Agriculture, and they also serve a vital domestic purpose in allowing countries to keep track of support for their agricultural sectors on an annual basis.
Export Competition/Subsidies
The obligations to reduce subsidised export quantities and the amount of money spent subsidising exports are at the heart of the reform programme on export subsidies. Anti-circumvention issues are also addressed in the Agriculture Agreement.
The Conceptual Framework
One of the primary topics addressed in the agriculture negotiations was the expansion of export subsidies in the years running up to the Uruguay Round. While export subsidies for industrial products have been outlawed since 1947 under the GATT, such subsidies for agricultural primary products have only been subject to limited regulations (Article XVI of the GATT), which have not proven to be effective.
The right to use export subsidies is now limited to four situations:
(i) export subsidies subject to product-specific reduction commitments within the limits specified in the schedule of the WTO Member concerned
(ii) any excess of budgetary outlays for export subsidies or subsidized export volume over the limits specified in the schedule which is covered by the “downstream flexibility” provision of Article 9.2(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture
(iii) export subsidies consistent with the special and differential treatment provision for developing country Members (Article 9.4 of the Agreement)
(iv) export subsidies other than those subject to reduction commitments provided that they are in conformity with the anti-circumvention disciplines of Article 10 of the Agreement on Agriculture. In all other cases, the use of export subsidies for agricultural products is prohibited (Articles 3.3, 8 and 10 of the Agreement)
Reduction Commitments
Export subsidies are defined in the Agricultural Agreement as “subsidies contingent on export performance, including the export subsidies outlined in detail in Article 9 of [the] Agreement.” This list, as detailed in Article 9.1 of the Agreement, covers the majority of the export subsidy practises that are common in the agricultural industry, including:direct export subsidies contingent on export performance;sales of non-commercial stocks of agricultural products for export at prices lower than comparable prices for such goods on the domestic market; producer financed subsidies such as government programmes which require a levy on all production which is then used to subsidise the export of a certain portion of that production;cost reduction measures such as subsidies to reduce the cost of marketing goods for export: this can include upgrading and handling costs and the costs of international freight, for example;internal transport subsidies applying to exports only, such as those designed to bring exportable produce to one central point for shipping; and subsidies on incorporated products, i.e. subsidies on agricultural products such as wheat contingent on their incorporation in export products such as biscuits.
All such export subsidies are subject to reduction commitments, which are represented in terms of both the amount of subsidised exports and the subsidy budgetary outlays.
Product Categories
WTO Members’ reduction obligations are listed on a product-by-product basis in their schedules. The universe of agricultural products was first separated into 23 categories or product groups, including wheat, coarse grains, sugar, beef, butter, cheese, and oilseeds, for this purpose. Some Members opted for a more disaggregated approach to commitments. Each product or group of items indicated in a Member’s schedule has a volume and budgetary outlay commitment that is individually binding, Only budgetary outlays are used to calculate the reduction pledges on “integrated products” (the last item on the Article 9 list). The schedules’ ceilings must be adhered to in each year of the implementation period, with some “overshooting” allowed in the second to fifth years of implementation (“downstream flexibility”). Members must be within their final export subsidy ceilings by the end of the implementation periods.
Rates Of Cut
Developed country members must cut the base-period volume of subsidised exports by 21% and the associated budgetary outlays for export subsidies by 36% over a six-year period in equal annual stages. In the case of developing country members, the required savings are 14 percent in volume over ten years and 24 percent in budgetary outlays over the same time period.
Developing countries may use the Agreement’s special and differential treatment provision (Article 9.4) to give marketing cost subsidies and internal transportation subsidies during the implementation period, provided that they are not used to bypass export subsidy reduction commitments.
In total, 25 Members (including the European Commission) have indicated export subsidy reduction commitments in their schedules, totaling 428 specific reduction commitments.
Products with no specific reduction commitment
Article 9.1 export subsidies are prohibited under the Agriculture Agreement for any agricultural commodity that is not subject to a reduction commitment as defined in the relevant portion of the Member’s schedule (with the exception, during the implementation, period of those benefiting from special and differential treatment).
Anti-Circumvention
In addition to the provisions explicitly related to the reduction commitments, the Agricultural Agreement contains provisions aimed at preventing the use of export subsidies not specifically stated in Article 9 of the Agreement to avoid reductions on other export subsidy commitments (Article 10). Food aid is defined in the anti-circumvention provisions so that transactions claiming to be food aid but not matching the conditions in the Agreement cannot be used to violate obligations. Food aid that fits the stipulated criteria is not deemed subsidised export and so is not subject to the Agricultural Agreement’s restrictions. In recognition that such mechanisms could be used to avoid commitments, the Agreement also calls for the adoption of internationally recognised rules on export credits and related measures. Any Member claiming that any quantity exported in excess of a reduction commitment level is not subsidised must demonstrate that no export subsidy, whether stated in Article 9 or not, has been granted for the quantity of exports in issue.
Notification Obligations
In the case of export subsidies, all Members must notify the Committee on Agriculture once a year. For the great majority of Members — those without reduction commitments — this entails little more than a statement that agricultural export subsidies have not been employed (or a listing of those measures that may be used by developing country Members under Article 9.4 of the Agreement if this has been the case). Members with reduction obligations in their schedules must include the annual use of subsidies in terms of both volume and financial outlays in their annual notice.
Members must also notify the use of food aid on an annual basis if such help is granted, as part of the anti-circumvention rules. Members with reduction commitments, as well as a number of additional “major exporters” as defined by the Committee, must also notify total agricultural exports.
The export subsidy notifications, like those in other areas, are used to assess how far the Committee on Agriculture has progressed in implementing its promises.
Conclusion
Global agricultural policy has a comparable impact on various economies. Developing countries are more subject to agricultural trade policy distortions and shifts, but they also decide the consequences of agricultural trade liberalization in some countries. Countries’ vulnerability to global policies and trade liberalisation agendas may be inherent in their economies, such as a high reliance on agriculture for income, employment, and foreign exchange earnings, a high reliance on food imports and food aid, and a relatively high degree of sector openness.
These circumstances may make a country’s economy vulnerable to global agricultural price patterns and volatility, long-term changes in access restrictions to export markets, and global policies impacting import competitiveness in domestic markets. With agricultural sector liberalization, increased international commerce has taken precedence, but this is no replacement for promoting domestically driven agricultural growth. Indeed, the majority of food produced in developing countries is consumed locally, with only a tiny percentage exported, implying that a completely trade-oriented approach has little relevance for many developing countries.
As a result, agricultural changes in the international trading system, such as the AOA, may have little impact on a country’s economic growth, particularly in developing countries, if they are implemented without a thorough examination of the country’s economic strategic position. Because agriculture accounts for a large portion of many emerging economies, implementing such reforms and participating in global trade without taking appropriate precautions could end in a crisis that these countries cannot afford.
As a result, it is vital to create a strong local market scenario that is in accordance with external prices, as well as appropriate laws, to ensure that national economies are protected from unnecessary and unfair competition in global markets. However, if such reforms are implemented with discipline and each country is willing to make such pledges for the benefit of the global trading system, it may result in a more balanced and equal world trade system. This would help to alleviate poverty and inequities while also increasing production and raising the global population’s standard of living.