Reviewing India’s ‘No-First-Use’ Policy Regarding Nuclear Weapons

The review presents the case of India’s No-first-use (NFU) policy and subsequent changes in it in the context of India’s security challenges.

On 16 August, 2019 speaking at an event in Pokhran on the first death anniversary of former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Indian Defence Minister Mr Rajnath Singh said:

 “Pokhran is the area which witnessed Atal Ji’s firm resolve to make India a nuclear power and yet remain firmly committed to the doctrine of ‘No First Use’. India has strictly adhered to this doctrine. What happens in future depends on the circumstances.”

His remarks came when tensions between India and Pakistan were high due to the Pulwama crisis and its aftermath, taking India and Pakistan to the brink of war. Following these events, and BJPs promise, the Modi-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government decided to change the status of Jammu and Kashmir from a state to a Union Territory on 5 August, 2019.

Tensions Between India And Pakistan

The discussion on India’s “no-first-use” (NFU) policy is not new. With high tensions between India-Pakistan and geopolitical factors between India-China, scholars and defence experts have raised this issue time and again. India conducted five nuclear tests and became a nuclear power state during the Prime Ministership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1998; Pakistan conducted six tests just after a few days.

Soon after, India brought up the “no-first-use” policy. Currently, India and Pakistan each may have between 140–150 nuclear warheads, along with a long-range of traditional and high-tech weaponry.

Given the background and the enduring India-Pakistan rivalry, how was the recent statement of the Indian Defence Minister reported by mainstream media globally? Have there been similar discussions on India’s “no-first-use” doctrine in the past? The review examines how mainstream media globally has reported India’s “no-first-use” policy, especially after the 16 August remark of the Indian Defence Minister.

It uses data gleaned from various published online materials from news portals and digital newspaper archives, acknowledging that though the issue is limited to South Asia, it has global implications. The review will briefly analyse and highlight the discussions around nuclear doctrines to contextualise the “no-first-use” policy.

Clary and Narang write, “India’s nuclear posture has three pillars:

1. India seeks to “[build] and [maintain] a credible minimum deterrent”.
2. India keeps its forces in a disassembled state to maximise safety and civilian control.
3. India has an unequivocal no-first-use policy, declaring that “nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere,” and “consciously rule[s] out” any “pre-emptive use” of nuclear weapons”.

What Is The NFU?

No-first-use (NFU) is a policy by a nuclear power country not to use nuclear weapons as a means of warfare unless first attacked by an adversary using nuclear weapons.

Feiveson and Hogendoorn explain that in justifying its nuclear weapons program, the Indian government noted in 1998 that because “there is no evidence yet on the part of the nuclear-weapon states to take decisive and irreversible steps in moving towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world,” and because some of the nuclear weapons states “have doctrines that permit the first use of nuclear weapons,” India was left with little choice but “to take necessary steps to ensure that the country’s nuclear option, developed and safeguarded over decades not be permitted to erode by a voluntary self-imposed restraint”.

Pakistan accelerated its nuclear weapons development in response. Contrary to India, Pakistan has adopted a first-use doctrine and has aggressively threatened the use of nuclear weapons on at least four occasions, in 1987, 1990, 1999 and June 2002.

Given the continuous friction between Pakistan and India along the line of control (LOC) and the growing Pakistan-China military cooperation, it makes it imperative for India to redefine and revisit its nuclear NFU policy, as pointed out by Lt Gen AB Shivane (former Director-General Mechanised Forces, India).

He called the Defence Minister’s statement on NFU a welcome statement in tune with the present proactive strategy of assured punitive retribution in the event of any threat to India’s national security, be it proxy war or otherwise. It also sends a clear message to Pakistan that it can face extinction by India’s nuclear response.

China will continue to support Pakistan in increasing the latter’s military warfare capacities, the recent events have highlighted the political will to put the nation first and the capabilities to respond should national security be at risk.

Brig SK Chatterji called 1998 tests by India launched India’s march into the league of nuclear powers, albeit a responsible one at that, they also put an end to nuclear blackmail by the Pakistanis.

Lekhi argues that it is a widely cited belief that Pakistan’s first use policy has been a reason for India’s subdued response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks. India has the right to pre-emptive self-defence for the greater security of South Asia. The UN charter accommodates such actions to safeguard national security.

Chellaney asserts that a nuclear doctrine cannot be cast in stone. India is waged between two nuclear-armed allies, therefore, adding flexibility to its “unconditional NFU nuclear posture can help underpin deterrence”.

Former Indian Diplomat Jaimini Bhagwati asserts that the Modi government should get rid of the NFU once and for all, though it should be done gently, not abruptly.

Vipin Narang, a scholar of security studies and nuclear proliferation at MIT, said that Rajnath Singh’s statement essentially renders no-first-use meaningless. Satinder Kumar Sikka, a physicist and part of the Indian 1998-nuclear testing team, says that India should be able to use nuclear weapons; in case of an increased risk that Pakistan would do it first.

Narang adds that if India decides to change its policy, as stated by the Defence Minister, Pakistan will be concerned about a pre-emptive strike by India. In turn, Pakistan might be prompt to use all its nuclear weapons first. Emeritus professor of Physics at the Jawaharlal Nehru University Rajaraman, however, calls the rhetoric a mere “war of words”.

However, Lakshman negates any probable changes in India’s no-first-use policy but adds that the current government is not shy of taking cross-border military action, in case of another sub-conventional attack on Indian soil, all the theories will “likely be tested”.

Panda gives another view, negating Chinese involvement in this context. He argues that there is little reason to believe that fears about China are behind in shifts in India’s thinking. Instead, “Indian investments in new, longer-range capabilities are all about continuing to deter Beijing.” For Pakistan, however, India’s focus is not just its capabilities but also its policy.

Should We Be Concerned?

Nature magazine’s story, titled India–Pakistan nuclear escalation: where could it lead?, also covered the views of Pakistani experts on this issue. A Chemistry Professor at the University of Karachi Atta-ur-Rahman describes the situation in 2019 as “very explosive” and “concerning”.

Feroz H Khan, a teacher of security studies and a former member of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons testing staff, argues that Pakistan began developing nuclear weapons in the 1970s as it had fewer armed forces than India, making it more vulnerable to lose a conventional war; and if Pakistan were to adopt the no-first-use policy, it would negate its reason for getting into nuclear weapon manufacturing in the first place.

Dawn ran two stories to show Pakistan’s stand on India’s stand and the future of NFU for Pakistan. The opinion expressed by the Pakistani writers points towards the fact that for the Pakistani state, the NFU policy holds no meaning, whereas India prefers a clear strategy towards the threat to its national security, reiterating its stand on whether it will be proactive in case of active aggression by a neighbouring country, particularly Pakistan.

Ramanathan argues against the ongoing narrative on changing India’s nuclear doctrine to a pre-emptive strike option. Pakistani strategists have often referred to America’s “flexible response” doctrine from the 1960s. Ramanathan reiterates that “flexible response” was primarily a rhetorical device intended to reassure America’s anxious NATO allies, American leadership in private has always been sceptical of it.

Furthermore, it will be impossible for India to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal with a first strike. “An India threatening pre-emptive strikes will find itself in the worst of all worlds: unable to carry out its threat but bringing nuclear risks into play early in a conflict or crisis,” adds Ramanathan.

Manish Tewari, former Union Minister during the UPA government in India, gives the historical background of nuclear armament and doctrines globally to show the dynamics in three South Asian countries- India, China and Pakistan. India and China “have enormous strategic depth, exceptional topographical fortifications, and robust conventional capability.”

Both countries agree that nuclear weapons are mere political weapons to be used to prevent any future use of such munitions by others. Pakistan, on the other hand, does not follow the same principles. Pakistani military establishment “enjoys near sovereignty in nuclear decision-making”. Hence, in the wake of high tensions, India and Pakistan must not stay away from a continuous dialogue, especially about the nuclear paradigm.

Professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Dr Rajesh Rajagopalan, claims that the counter-intuitive logic of India’s nuclear doctrine has been controversial from the very beginning. “If the primary purpose — indeed, the only purpose — of nuclear weapons was deterrence of other nuclear weapons, then threatening retaliation was the only manner in which these weapons could be used.”

Furthermore, “deterrence and retaliation automatically meant that there was no logic to using nuclear weapons first: hence, no first use”, which suits India’s circumstances.

Chakravarty writes that the ideals of Gandhi and Nehru of moral aversion to the use of force have led India’s defence policy for decades. Despite Pakistan’s irresponsible acts, India should stick to its no-first-use policy for stability in the subcontinent.

Analysts worry that in the case of Pulwama style attack, the tensions may rise higher, and unless one side voluntarily holds back, such military escalation could lead to strikes against nuclear targets.

Mizokami reiterates that neither side wants war, and given history, both India and Pakistan should limit the numbers of nuclear weapons and their use for the sake of survival.

Mizokami gives a comparative picture of both countries’ conventional as well as nuclear arsenal. Adding further, Mizokami argues that a possible nuclear war between the two countries would start as a conventional war, “which might very well be sparked by a cross-border incident”. It would lead to further escalations, leading to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.

“A successful two-hundred-kiloton thermonuclear device dropped on Islamabad, the kind which India attempted to test in 1998, would kill nearly 225,000 and injure 442,000 more”; whereas, “a fifty-kiloton bomb dropped on New Delhi would kill 4,68,000 and injure 1.5 million”. The fatalities can go even higher, overwhelming the local governments, “risking the loss of control over both societies”.

Referring to the Pakistani Prime Minister’s remarks that “there will be no first [strike] from our side ever”; and its rebuttal by the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs the same day claiming “there’s no change in Pakistan’s nuclear policy”, Rajiv Nayan establishes that Pakistani government is well-aware of “the limitations of its first use policy/posture”.

Noticeably, just 2 days after its PM’s remarks, Pakistani Military spokesman Major General Asif Ghafoor said that Pakistan does not follow the no-first-use policy.