What Is Nuclear No First Use Policy?
‘No first use‘ (NFU) refers to a nuclear power pledge not to use nuclear weapons as a means of warfare unless it is first attacked by an adversary using nuclear weapons. Earlier, the concept had also been applied to chemical and biological warfare. The nuclear policy of No First Use is a commitment that, even in the most profound crisis or war, even if a country had reason to fear an adversary might use nuclear weapons imminently, even if a country might benefit from nuclear first use, the country will forgo the option of the first strike.
In short, it is a doctrine of good faith. India first adopted nuclear “No first use” policy after its second nuclear test, Pokhran-II, in 1998. In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrine. This asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a ‘retaliation only’ policy.
The Controversial Legacy Of The No First Use Policy
No first use policy has been the centre of controversy from its introduction. Top-level government office-bearers and political leaders have questioned the NFU policy from time to time.
Recently, amid India’s increasing tensions with Pakistan, speaking at an event in Pokhran, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said, “Till today, our nuclear policy is ‘No First Use.’ What happens in the future depends on the circumstances.” His comment does not directly mean a formal change in the doctrine or the policy, yet, it is an obvious and remarkable statement from the highest level of the Indian government.
In November 2016, just two years after PM Modi comes into power, defence minister, Manohar Parrikar had courted controversy with his statement, “Why should I bind myself? I should say I am a responsible nuclear power, and I will not use it irresponsibly.” and clarified later that it was only in his ‘personal capacity’.
Lt. Gen. (retd.) B. S. Nagal, a former strategic forces commander, similarly argued in favour of a doctrine of ‘ambiguity’. Former national security advisor Shivshankar Menon claimed in his 2016 memoir that India’s existing doctrine, even with its declaration of no first use, had a ‘grey area’, in the circumstance that Indian officials concluded another nuclear state was preparing for imminent nuclear attack, in such scenario Pre-emption might be permissible.
Even our late statesman A.B. Vajpayee’s commitment to no first use had its limits. In 2000, Vajpayee told a crowd in Jalandhar, “We are being threatened [by Pakistan] with a nuclear attack. Do they understand what it means? If they think we would wait for them to drop a bomb and face destruction, they are mistaken.” These are just some of the many instances when top-level officials and political leaders have questioned the No First Use policy’s sanctity.
Why Do We Rethink The NFU Policy?
A first strike adversary nation will endeavour to launch counterforce strikes to eliminate India’s command and control systems, destroy nuclear retaliatory capability, reduce conventional offensive ability, and strike important industrial and infrastructure centres, and vital population centres. Collateral damage is inevitable; the outcome of an NFU decision will be large-scale destruction in the country.
So, practically, Pakistan won’t let India get a second strike counterforce in Pakistan won’t just use TNW(tactical nuclear weapons) if a nuclear war takes place. Still, it will use everything, which means there is no space in practice for a second strike counterforce, India will have to go first. Moreover, Pakistan does not have an NFU policy and has built a nuclear weapons program designed to deter India and neutralize its much more extensive conventional military. Thus, militarily, ‘no first use’ puts India in a disadvantageous position.
Pakistan’s political as well as military establishments have often used the larger nuclear arsenal and lack of restraint policy to blackmail India for dialogue. India also has concerns about China, which posses a more prominent military force and more advanced strategic weapons. So, the case to revoke the NFU pledge has also been made, keeping in mind about China. Given the increasing asymmetry of conventional military power between the two countries, some analysts believe that India should revoke its “no first use’ policy. Where India fails to deter China conventionally, it should leverage its nuclear capability.
Has NFU Been Changed?
There was no official word from the defence ministry, but people familiar with such developments said Rajnath Singh’s comments did not amount to a change in the state policy. They, however, noted that security doctrines were not set in stone and had to reflect changing circumstances as national defence is a non-negotiable priority. That way, India can tweak this policy for the security of the country. That is why it should not be seen in a very black and white polarity.
The NFU policy’s main objective was to reassure the international community about the responsibility, but states also have to deter their adversaries. So, clarity on NFU is required to encourage, but ambiguity to NFU is to deter. And this government has decided to shift the balance towards the uncertainty explicitly.
So, officially it has not given up the policy, but it has been so eroded and crumbled that it lacks in any real meaning in terms of reassurance of peace to its adversaries. Thus, It has become a hollow declaration. So, the doctrine will be kept, but it is always subjected to change and revision, and when push comes to shove, we shouldn’t assume that NFU policy will bind or restrain India from acting in its national interest. Thus, No First Use policy isn’t dead, but losing its sanctity.
What Can Be The Alternative Of NFU?
With the aforementioned developments, India is perhaps moving into the direction of Counterforce Pre-emption, which can be the best alternative for the NFU policy. It implies the ability to eliminate adversary’s ability to retaliate if India uses nuclear weapons.
Talking about such pre-emptive counterforce measures, in April 2017 defence Secretary of UK, Michael Fallon confirmed that the UK would use nuclear weapons in a ‘pre-emptive initial strike’ in the most extreme circumstances. In India’s case, the initial pre-emptive strike implies, if there is a detection of the adversary, whoever it is, China or Pakistan using nuclear weapons against India, then India reserves the right to respond and go first, in the sense that pre-emption is consistent with No First Use doctrine. It is best capsulated by “India won’t be the first one to use nuclear weapons, but it won’t be the second, either.”
Possible Adverse Effects Of Abrogating NFU Policy
Yet, revoking the NFU would have its costs. First, India’s image as a responsible nuclear power is central to its nuclear diplomacy. Nuclear restraint has allowed New Delhi to get accepted in the global mainstream. Within a decade of Pokhran-II, India has been recognized in the global nuclear order because of its nuclear commitments. It is now a member of most of the technology denial regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement.
Second, parting away with NFU would also be costly, as a purely retaliatory nuclear use is easier to operationalize. Nuclear pre-emption is always an expensive policy as it requires massive investment not only in weapons and delivery systems but also in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) infrastructure.
Does A Change In The NFU Policy Make Anyone Safer?
If India rethinks Nuclear No First Use policy, it won’t surprise Pakistan and China as Islamabad and Beijing have long doubted India’s nuclear NFU policy. So, in many ways, Rajnath Singh was stating what Pakistan already believed. But in doing so, he became the highest serving Government of India official to explicitly say that India’s no first use policy is neither permanent nor absolute and that one day, at its discretion and without warning, it may be tempted to strike first. NFU, as an official policy, may not be dead, but it no longer has any meaning to India’s adversaries.
This only puts more pressure on Pakistan and China to respond in kind. As India, Pakistan, and China make these moves and countermoves, the question remains: is anyone safer? It is not sure whether India or anybody in the region is safer by further eroding India’s NFU policy, as the deterrent threat trying to be made explicitly to China and Pakistan will also evoke them to initiate retaliatory actions. In some sense, Pakistan’s worst fear may have come true, as they never trusted in India’s NFU policy. It gives Pakistan a shred of additional evidence to do some more dangerous things that they have been doing.
But in the end, it is a fact that all doctrines or policies need periodic reviews, and India’s case is no exception. Given how rapidly India’s strategic environment is evolving, it is imperative to think clearly about all vital matters.